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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FRED BROADBENT, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 920409-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1990) 35-1-82.53 (2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), and 63-46b-14 (1988). This is an appeal from part of 
a final order wherein the Utah State Industrial Commission 
determined that Petitioner Fred Broadbent ("Broadbent") suffered an 
industrial injury on October 6, 1982. Due to conflicting medical 
opinions the Administrative Law Judge, Timothy Allen, ("ALJ") 
referred Broadbent to a medical panel. On December 10, 1991, a 
medical panel determined that Broadbent had a twenty-three percent 
(23%) impairment rating due to the accident. However, the ALJ 
ordered that interest be paid only from December 23, 1991. On May 
29, 1992, the Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ's order. A 
Petition for Review was timely filed on June 23, 1992. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the Utah Industrial Commission err in choosing 
December 23, 1991 as the starting date for interest on an award for 
an injury on October 6, 1982, where the applicable statute provides 
for interest from the date when the benefit would have been payable 
but for the dispute and when the insurance carrier had use of Mr. 
Broadbent's money for an extended time? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
A statute found in Utah Code Ann. §3 5-1-78 (1988) and 
Rule 490-1-12(b) (Utah Admin. Code 1991) are dispositive of this 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Broadbent suffered an industrial accident on October 
6, 1982. (R. 1, 59) He was released to return to work on June 9, 
1983. (R. 186) The insurance carrier paid temporary total 
disability payments ("TTD") through the same day. (R. 14) Over 
the next few years Mr. Broadbent received several impairment 
ratings from various doctors. (R. 186, 225, 231, 262, 286, and 
160) The differences in medical opinion and inability of the 
parties to agree necessitated the appointment of a medical panel. 
(R. 59) 
On December 10, 1991, the medical panel determined that 
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Broadbent had a twenty-three percent (23%) impairment rating. (R. 
56) On March 9, 1992, the ALJ entered his Order awarding Broadbent 
a twenty-three percent (23%) permanent partial impairment rating. 
(R. 59-61) However, the ALJ ordered defendants to pay interest at 
8% only from December 23, 1991. (R. 59-61) 
Broadbent disputed the ALJ's order concerning the award 
of interest.1 (R. 64-68) He filed a timely Motion for Review. 
(R. 64-68) On May 29, 1992, the Industrial Commission affirmed the 
ALJ's order. (R. 113-120) Broadbent then timely filed this 
appeal. (R. 123) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Broadbent sustained a serious back, shoulder, neck, and 
rectum injury in an industrial accident on October 6, 1982 while 
employed by Tolboe Construction Company, which was insured by 
Industrial Indemnity. (R. 1, 59) Richard M. Thomas, M.D., was one 
of Broadbent's treating physicians. He performed the necessary 
surgery following the accident. Dr. Thomas referred Broadbent to 
Douglas B. Kirkpatrick, M.D. for additional treatment. (R. 222) 
Broadbent had been receiving chiropractic care from Dr. 
Kelly B. Jarvis, B.S., D.C. prior to the industrial accident. 
After the industrial accident he continued to see Dr. Jarvis, who 
also treated him for the industrial accident. Dr. Jarvis cleared 
Interest is calculated at eight percent (8%) per annum. Mr. Broadbent's PPD weekly amount was $189.00. When his last PPD payment was due 
on October 27, 1984, Mr. Broadbent was owed $13,562.62 in PPD payments and $460.33 in interest. Therefore, on October 27th every following year, Mr. 
Broadbent was owed $1,085.00 in interest. Interest was due until approximately August 17, 1992 when defendant's tendered the amount ordered by the 
Industrial Commission. Broadbent will be owed an approximate total of $8,929.66 in interest. 
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Broadbent for work as of June 9, 1983. (R. 186) Defendants paid 
TTD through June 9, 1983. (R. 14) Following medical treatment, 
Broadbent returned to work on September 1, 1983. (R. 10) 
Dr. Kirkpatrick, a neurosurgeon, gave Broadbent a twenty 
percent (20%) impairment rating on April 23, 1984. (R. 225) The 
record is silent as to why this case did not settle at the 20% 
impairment rating. Dr. Kirkpatrick then gave Broadbent a five 
percent (5%) rating on September 5, 1984. (R. 231) 
Bruce F. Sorenson, M.D.f a neurosurgeon, was also one of 
Brocidbent's treating physicians. Dr. Sorenson gave Broadbent a 
sixteen percent (16%) impairment rating on May 26, 1987. (R. 262) 
The record is silent as to why three years transpired between Dr. 
Kirkpatrick's impairment rating and Dr.. Sorenson's impairment 
rating. 
Broadbent wanted a second opinion so he went to Milton D. 
Thomas, M.D. On February 2, 1988 Dr. Thomas gave Broadbent an 
impairment rating of fifteen percent (15%) . (R. 286) Broadbent 
felt that he was more seriously impaired than either Dr. Thomas' or 
Dr. Sorenson's impairment ratings. 
On June 4, 1987, defendants tendered an offer of 
settlement for the sixteen percent (16%) impairment rating. (R. 
14) However, because Broadbent correctly believed he was more 
seriously impaired, he rejected the offer. 
On or about August 30, 1990 Broadbent retained the 
services of the law firm of Sykes and Vilos. Broadbent was then 
evaluated by John M. Bender, M.D., a physiatrist, who gave him an 
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impairment rating of thirty-four percent (34%) on September 18, 
1990. (R. 160) Dr. Bender's rating included a twenty-four percent 
(24%) impairment for physical disabilities. (R. 160) Because 
Broadbent was experiencing Parkinson-like symptoms, Dr. Bender 
included a twelve percent (12%) permanent physical impairment 
rating. (R. 160) Broadbent then offered to settle for the twenty-
four percent (24%) impairment rating. (R. 15-16) Defendants 
refused this offer. 
On December 10, 1991, a medical panel, ordered by the 
Industrial Commission, awarded Broadbent a twenty-three percent 
(23%) impairment rating. (R. 56) The medical panel stated that 
the Parkinson-like symptoms were not a result of the industrial 
accident. (R. 55-56) On March 9, 1992 the ALJ, in his Order, 
adopted the medical panel's impairment rating of twenty-three 
percent (23%). (R. 59-61) Judge Allen also ordered Broadbent's 
compensation to be paid in a lump sum plus eight percent (8%) 
interest per annum from December 23, 1991. (R. 59-61) 
Broadbent filed a Motion for Review on the payment of 
interest. (R. 64-68) On May 29, 1992 the Industrial Commission 
affirmed Judge Allen's Order. (R. 113-120) The Commission stated: 
The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in 
ordering that interest on the PPD award commenced on 
December 23, 1991 since that was the date that the 
liability of the respondents was first medically 
determined. We agree with the respondents on this issue. 
Petitioner timely filed his Petition for Review. (R. 123) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The commission failed to correctly interpret and apply 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 (1988) and Rule 490-1-12(b) (Utah Admin. 
Code 1991). Consequently, it erroneously selected December 23, 
1991 as the date when Broadbent's benefits became due and payable. 
Broadbent was released to return to work on June 9, 1983. 
This ended his temporary total disability (TTD), and began his 
permanent partial disability (PPD).2 Therefore, a correct reading 
of the above Statute and Rule would mean that Broadbent's benefits 
became due and payable the next day. Consequently, interest should 
have been awarded from June 10, 1983, until the benefits were paid. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
The issue on appeal is a question of law. In considering 
a question of law, the reviewing Court affords no deference to the 
Industrial Commissions legal conclusions. Rather, this Court 
employs a correction-of-error standard. Hurley v. Industrial 
Commission. 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). This Court must closely 
scrutinize the Commission's order to determine whether the 
appropriate legal principles were applisid when the commission 
2 
Broadbent received temporary total disability payments from February 17, 1987 to and including March 8, 1987 and from August 14, 1986 through 
and including August 27, 1986. This is 6.875 weeks. Naturally, interest would not accrue on the PPD during those few weeks. Consequently, Mr. Broadbent'* 
interest would be reduced by $143.45. 
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failed to award interest before December 23, 1991, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-78. 
POINT I 
DID THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERR IN 
CHOOSING DECEMBER 23,1991 AS THE STARTING DATE 
FOR INTEREST ON AN AWARD FOR AN INJURY ON 
OCTOBER 6, 1982, WHERE THE APPLICABLE STATUTE 
PROVDES FOR INTEREST FROM THE DATE WHEN THE 
BENEFIT WOULD HAVE BEEN PAYABLE BUT FOR THE 
DISPUTE AND WHEN THE INSURANCE CARRIER HAD 
USE OF APPLICANT'S MONEY FOR AN EXTENDED TIME? 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 establishes when interest is to 
be paid: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall 
include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would 
have otherwise become due and payable. 
(Emphasis added) 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court in Crenshaw v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 712 P.2d 247 (Utah 1985), stated: 
Interest on each payment when due is not 
intended as a penalty or punishment for the 
refusal to pay. The interest is charged to 
the employees use of someone else's money. 
The claimant is unable to make any use of the 
money and the value of the benefit is 
diminished when payment is delayed. Any such 
delay in payment inevitably results in the 
claimant subsidizing the employees insurer. 
By Statute, interest must be paid on each 
benefit payment which comprises an award from 
the date the payment would have otherwise been 
due and payable. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 250. 
Furthermore, § 35-1-78 applies retroactively. In 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985), the 
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Supreme Court stated: 
Thus, it is clear that compensation for worker 
disability is legislation for the public 
welfare. It is also clear that the statute 
providing for interest on unpaid benefits was 
a legislative attempt to remedy a serious 
social problem: the depreciation of the value 
of benefits as a result of non-receipt of the 
weekly benefit for months, or perhaps years, 
until a final determination of eligibility and 
an award are made. To effect this purpose, 
the legislature could only have intended this 
remedy to apply to as broad a range of awards 
as possible. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 583. 
These cases teach several important principles: for 
example, interest on the award is mandatory, even though it is 
"yecirs [before] ... a final determination of eligibility .... [is] 
made." Also, the social reasons for interest include: compensation 
to the employee for the "employer7s use of someone else's money"; 
establishing a disincentive for employer's delay; and preventing 
the injustice of "the claimant subsidizing the employer's insurer." 
The only question to be answered, here, is when did 
Broadbent's benefits "otherwise become due and payable?" The 
Commission ruled: 
interest . . . [should] commence on December 
23, 1991 since that was the date that the 
liability of the respondents was first 
medically determined. (Emphasis added). 
(Exhibit A) . The Commission claims reliance upon Rule 490-1-12 
(Utah Admin. Code 1991). However, that rule actually states: 
For the purpose of interest calculation, 
benefits shall become "due and payable" ... as 
follows: 
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2. Permanent partial compensation shall be 
due and payable on the next day following the 
termination of temporary total disability. 
However, where the condition is not fixed for 
rating purposes, the interest shall commence 
from the date the permanent partial impairment 
can be medically determined. 
Id. (Emphasis added). The day following termination of TTD was 
June 10, 1983. Broadbent was given a twenty percent (20%) 
impairment rating from Dr. Kirkpatrick on April 23, 1984. 
Therefore, on April 24, 1984, the condition was "fixed [medically] 
for rating purposes" as of that date, although the parties 
disagreed on the rating. 
The Commission focused on the less applicable language in 
the second sentence of Rule 490-1-12(2) which states, "where the 
condition is not fixed for rating purposes", (Emphasis added) but 
ignored the most applicable first sentence. Even if the second 
sentence applies, the Commission erroneously decided that the 
medical panel's 23% impairment rating began with the date that the 
liability of the respondents was first medically determined. 
However, the second sentence of Rule 490-1-12(2) clearly provides 
that interest liability accrues "from the date the permanent 
partial impairment can be medically determined" (Emphasis added) 
not when it was determined. This sentence takes effect only "where 
the condition is not fixed for rating purposes". This must have 
reference to the medical "condition" not being "fixed" or stable 
for rating purposes. Under such conditions, it would clearly be 
unjust to impose interest on the employer, who is probably paying 
TTD anyway. Where the medical condition is not stable, the second 
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sentence of sub§(2) kicks in and says that interest commences from 
the date that permanent partial impairment "can be medically 
determined". 
The second section of sub§(2) clearly does not come into 
play in this case. The record shows that Mr. Broadbent was cleared 
to return to work on June 9, 1983 and the temporary total 
disability payments ended on that day. By defendant's own 
admission on the compensation agreement, the TTD ended on June 9, 
1983. Under the Commission's own rule, that constituted 
"termination of temporary total disability" and his "permanent 
partial compensation shall be due and payable on the next day 
following ...". 
It is not uncommon for doctors to award varying 
impairment ratings. In fact, Broadbent was given disability 
ratings on the following dates: April 23, 1984 (20%); September 
5, 1984 (5%); May 26, 1987 (16%); February 2, 1988 (15%); 
September 18, 1990 (24%); and December 23, 1991 (23%). 
Broetdbent's permanent partial impairment not only could be, but was 
medically determined five times before the medical panel's rating! 
However, the date that the amount of permanent partial impairment 
was determined is not the standard set forth in the statute or the 
rule. The statute, anticipating occasional disputes between 
employees and insurance companies, provides that interest accrues 
"from the date when each benefit payment would otherwise have 
become due and payable". Since that cannot always be determined 
prospectively, "otherwise" must refer to a contemplated „ 
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retrospective determination. It is the only way it makes sense. 
With that interpretation, no matter when the amount of PPD is 
ultimately decided, the claimant is entitled to interest from the 
date that the PPD should have been paid but for the dispute. In 
other words, but for the dispute over the amount, the payments 
would have "otherwise become due and payable" on the day following 
the termination of TTD. In Broadbent's case, but for the dispute 
and the delay, his benefits would have been "otherwise ... due and 
payable" on the day following the termination of his TTD. This 
date was June 10, 1983. Therefore, Broadbent is owed interest from 
June 10, 1983, the day following his first impairment rating. 
The commission ignores the Supreme Court's explanation of 
§ 35-1-78. As shown above, insurance carriers must pay interest 
when they have the use of an employee's money. Also, "rainy such 
delay in payment results in the claimant subsidizing the employer's 
insured." Crenshaw, at 250. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that the employee's benefits must include interest even if 
it takes years "until a final determination of eligibility and an 
award are made." Marshall, at 583. 
This case is similar to Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 
P.2d 676 (Utah 1990) . In Heaton, the applicant was injured in 1975 
and applied for permanent total disability in 1978. The ALJ did 
not rule on the application for permanent total disability. The 
employer's insurance carrier liability expired October 5, 1981. 
They had been making all of their liability payments to Heaton. 
Id. at 677. In 1981 Heaton wrote a letter for clarification 
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concerning his claim. The ALJ replied that Heaton should get a 
report from a physician stating Heaton was unable to work and that 
his condition had worsened. In 1985 Heaton submitted a letter from 
Dr. McNaught that supported his claim. It also stated that Heaton 
had not recovered from surgeries performed in 1976 and 1977. 
Despite this, the ALJ and the commission determined Heaton was 
totally disabled from the date of Dr. McNaught's examination, July 
25, 1985. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Heaton was 
totally disabled from October 6, 1981. Heaton, at 682. The Court 
then awards interest on all benefits from October 6, 1981, when the 
second injury fund should have started making payments. Id. at 
677. 
The claimants interpretation of the statute and rule is 
consistent with the Utah Supreme Court ccises that have addressed 
the issue. This interpretation also has a salutary and just effect 
on industrial relations. Consider the lopsided advantage for the 
employer and the insurance company if the rule was any other way. 
The employee receiving an on-the-job injury must go through the 
Workers Compensation system, with access of the courts being 
prohibited under normal circumstances. In that system, he 
encounters sophisticated insurance companies, whose lawyers are 
very knowledgeable about the act and adroit at finding loopholes., 
If the applicant even has an attorney (and many do not) , there are 
relatively few claims attorneys who have substantial knowledge 
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about the Workers Compensation system.3 If this court establishes 
a judicial interpretation that allows interest to begin only when 
the final determination of a disputed PPI claim is made, then 
employers and the insurance companies will have little incentive to 
see that claims are promptly and resolutely determined. It will 
reward an employer or insurance company's unjust delay, since the 
insurance company will have use of the employee's money for 
investment purposes, without paying any interest. Such a ruling 
would also have some very subtle - but deleterious - effects. It 
would lead to a "hard-ball" attitude in bargaining that would be 
hard for the insurance company adjusters and representatives to 
resist. On a closed issue, they could simply tell the claimant to 
"go jump in the lake", forcing the claimant to file for a hearing 
and lose substantial interest. If upheld, the Commission's 
interpretation would be bad for industrial relations. 
The defendant may say that this case is "different" 
because Mr. Broadbent was allegedly hard to deal with. Defendant's 
may imply that it is partly Broadbent's own fault that this matter 
has not been resolved sooner because he wouldn't take reasonable 
offers, and that he allegedly made no effort to have his attorney 
bring it to a head.4 These ingenuous arguments ignore important 
facts and disregard the main issue. Perhaps if Mr. Broadbent were 
as sophisticated as the insurance company attorneys, he should be 
1991-2 Yellow pages has approximately 34 listings for Workers Compensation attorneys, many of which are defense law firms. 
Mr. Broadbent actually had three counsel of record at various times. 
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held to a different standard. However, one cannot forget that the 
insurance company or its attorneys could have filed for a hearing 
as early as 1983 or early 1984 if the matter was not progressing to 
the point of speedy resolution. The defense interpretation, 
accepted by the Industrial Commission, gives the insurance company 
no incentive to investigate and resolve the issue because, after 
all, why kick a sleeping dog and possibly provoke a PPI claim that 
Broadbent might otherwise forget to file, particularly if there is 
no interest penalty. Therefore, the employer and his insurance 
cohorts can let the matter linger on for y€»ars, like they did here, 
all the while using, investing and presumably making interest on 
Broadbent's money. When Broadbent finally gets counsel that brings 
the matter to a head, and a hearing, the insurance company can 
claim that it was Broadbent's fault. Under the Commission's 
erroneous interpretation, it would only pay Broadbent interest from 
the day of the hearing, even though it has used Broadbent's money 
for the intervening years. This is unjust. It will lead to great 
mischief. 
In the case sub iudice, it is undisputed that Broadbent 
was injured on October 6, 1982. It is undisputed he received a 
release to return to work on June 9, 1983 and defendants paid his 
TTD through June 9, 1983. For a variety of reasons which include 
employer delay, it has taken years for a final determination of PPI 
and an award to be made. Lastly, it is undisputed that Broadbent 
has a twenty-three percent (23%) impairment rating "due to [sic] 
industrial accident." (R. 56) Therefore, interest is due on all 
14 
benef its from, June 10 , 1983. 
POINT II 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, THE EMPLOYER'S 
INSURANCE CARRIER, MADE NO TENDER OF THE 
AMOUNT OWED TO MR. BROADBENT UNTIL AUGUST 17, 
1992, WHEN THE AWARD WAS FINALLY PAID. SINCE 
THE AMOUNT OF PERMANENT PARTIAL IMPAIRMENT 
DUE MR. BROADBENT WAS FAIRLY DISPUTED UNTIL A 
MEDICAL PANEL RESOLVED THE ISSUE IN 1991, AND 
SINCE THE EMPLOYER MADE NO TENDER BEFORE 
THAT TIME, INTEREST IS DUE BROADBENT FROM THE 
DAY AFTER HIS TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY 
BEGAN, PURSUANT TO STATUTE AND A RULE OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
It is well established 1 a w i n IJ t a h t h a t t e n < I e r o f a i i 
amount in dispute arrests the accrual of interest, if the rightful 
tender is not accepted. However, the tender, in order * > stop the 
running of interest, must be made r - * 
without conditions, Sieverts v. White. 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P. 2d 974 
(1954) . This rule is also applied to the arresting of interest on 
judgments. 8 6 C.J.S., tender, §32(c)i( page 57 5. 
In the case sub judica, the medical panel determined that 
Broadbent was entitled to a PPI award of twenty-three (23%) 
percent. The statute provides that that award takes effect when 
TTD payments terminate. From the termination of TTD on June 9, 
1983, until approximately August 17, 1992, (the date of payment), 
there was never a defense tender of the full amount owed. There 
was an offer for less thi-- • - .e ful I amount owed, but that doesn't 
satisfy the requirements of the tender. 
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The insurance company's perfidious attitude in this case 
is amply demonstrated by the fact that the ALJ entered his 2 3% 
award on March 9, 1992. The insurance company did not make payment 
on that order until August 17, 1992, or 161 days after the award 
was made. Such conduct by the insurance company hardly constitutes 
a good faith tender that would arrest the accrual of interest, even 
in part. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse the Commission and find that 
Broadbent is entitled to interest from June 10, 1983. Otherwise 
Broadbent would be subsidizing the insurance carrier, contrary to 
the well established law of Utah. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of September, 1992. 
SYKES & VILOS, P.C. 
•lUCpSNETF. MILL 
Alzrorney for A p p e l l e e 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, 4 true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the 
attorneys at the address listed below, on the 23rd day of 
September, 1992. 
Stuart L. Poelman, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for Industrial Indemnity 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt 1 ake City, Utah 84151-02 50 
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ATTACHMENT "A" 
Medical Panel Report 
Gerald R. Moress M.D., RC. 
NEUROLOGY 370 E. South Temple, Su.te 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 363-^386 
December J 0, 199] 
Timothy C. Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
State of Utah 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Adjudication Division 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Re: Fred Broadbent 
DOI: 10-6-82 
Emp: Tolboe Construction 
Company 
Dear Judge Allen: 
A Panel consisting of Gerald R. Moress, M.D.# Neurologist, and 
Wallace E. Hess, M.D., Orthopaedist, performed a Panel 
evaluation on Mr. Broadbent. The only x-rays available to the 
Panel were x-rays from Dr. Jarvis in 1983, cervical and 
dorsal. Complete spine x-rays and right shoulder xrays were 
taken today to aid the Panel in its evaluation. 
HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL INJURY: 
10/6/82, while wearing a hard hat, Mr. Broadbent, then age 42, 
fell approximately 35 feet down an air shaft. During the fall 
a 1/2 foot piece of pipe penetrated his rectum. He said that 
he fell on his head and right shoulder. According to the 
Utah Valley Hospital Emergency Room record, there was no loss 
of consciousness. When seen in the emergency room he had 
contusions and abrasions of the right side of the face, 
shoulder. His actual complaints in the emergency room were 
pain in the right shoulder. The admitting neurological 
examination was normal. Perianal sensation was normal. He 
was admitted under the care of surgeon, Richard Thomas. 
During the hospitalization the perineum was debrided and 
pieces of the coccyx and sacrum were excised. A diverting 
sigmoid colostomy was performed. He was seen by neurosurgeon, 
Douglas Kirkpatrick. Studies of his neck showed a fracture 
at the spinous process of C5. Tomogram of the cervical spine 
showetd just the spinous fracture though a very mild 
compression fracture with rounding off of the anterior 
superior corner of C5 body was described. He was discharged 
on 10/18/82 and then readmitted by Dr. Thomas on 11/18/82 at 
which time the colostomy was closed. 
A follow up neurosurgical visit was paid to Dr. Kirkpatrick 
on 2/2/83. Dr. Kirkpatrick said that he had seen Mr. 
Broadbent initially in the hospital because, of hand numbness. 
He reiterated the history of his injury and said that when he 
had fallen he had hit his hip, shoulder and forehead. 
Numbness in the ring and little fingers of both hands had 
dissipated. The doctor diagnosed at the time of the injury 
cord contusion, concussion, C8 radiculopathy which will 
improve him. Conservative care was recommended without 
surg€*ry. He had returned to Dr. Kirkpatrick because of shock 
like feelings down his body whenever he flexed his neck. 
These* were from the mid chest to his knees. Bowel, bladder 
and sexual functions were normal. He had some neck pain with 
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rotation and some numbness into the fingers of both hands. 
The doctor diagnosed cervical disc and spine injury with 
intermittent myelopathy. A cervical myelogram was 
recommended. The patient demurred. 
Beginning in 1983 Mr. Broadbent started to see chiropractor, 
Kelly Jarvis, whom he had seen previously and continues to see 
for chiropractic treatments. 
In February of 1983 Mr. Broadbent referred himself to 
neurosurgeon, Bruce Sorensen, who did numerous studies 
including cervical myelogram, head CT scan and eventually MRI 
scan of the brain and cervical spine. In fact, Dr. Sorensen 
admitted him to LDS Hospital in 1983 then again in 1987, both 
times for myelography. The cervical myelogram in February of 
1987 showed that at C5-6 there had been a bulging that had 
taken place since the previous 1983 examination and probably 
represented a central herniation. The canal was described as 
being large with a great deal of room around the cord. At 
L4-5 a bulging disc was described. The brain MRI was normal. 
When admitted in 1987 by Dr. Sorensen he was complaining of 
some weakness of his left arm, vague left leg difficulties, 
as well. Dr. Sorensen felt the myelography did not count for 
his symptomatology. 
Mr. Broadbent was seen again by Dr. Kirkpatrick in April of 
1984 for a disability rating. He was most concerned about the 
electrical shock feeling he was getting in his neck when he 
flexed, the so called Lhermitte's sign. He was able to return 
to work in July of 1983. He was also complaining of weakness 
and numbness of his arms. Clonus of his left index finger was 
described, decreased strength in the left triceps and biceps. 
He had generalized numbness. He still had aching in his neck. 
Some weakness of the upper extremities was found. Sensation 
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was normal except for numbness in the right thumb and middle 
fingers. His gait and stance were normal. He reviewed 
myelogram that he felt was significant showing narrowing at 
C5-6. He diagnosed C5-6 disc injury with spondylosis and 
myelopathy, C6-7 disc disease and spondylosis and gave him a 
20% impairment rating. He recommended cervical surgery. He 
returned to Dr. Kirkpatrick in July of 1984 because he said 
he was worse, burning in his neck, intrascapular region, down 
the back of both of his arms, clonus of the left index finger 
was again described, cervical range of motion was diminished. 
His gait and station were normal, he was admitted 8/14/84 to 
Utah Valley Hospital and underwent complete myelography that 
showed a disc bulge at C5-6. There was a difference of 
opinion between Dr. Kirkpatrick's interpretation of the study 
and that of the radiologist. The radiologist felt that it was 
not ci significant finding and Dr. Kirkpatrick thought it was 
more significant. The patient did not want to have any 
surgery done. On 5/9/84 Dr. Kirkpatrick noted that diffuse 
weakness was difficult to pin down and now gave him an 
impairment rating of 5%. 
In May of 1988 a Work Capacity Evaluation was performed that 
indicated that his physical manpower characteristic work level 
were medium. It was felt that he was feasible for employment. 
Neurological evaluation was performed by Alvin Wirthlin on 
4/8/86. The doctor saw him specifically because of loss of 
control of the left arm and leg over the prior 6 to 8 months. 
He had evidence of akinesia, mild mask faces, increased tone 
in the left arm, he had a slow gait with shortened steps and 
no arm swing on the left. The doctor diagnosed 
hemiparkinsonism. Dr. Wirthlin continued to follow him 
through October of 1988. In April of 1986 Dr. Wirthlin made 
mention that the relationship between the trauma and the 
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Parkinsonism was "fortuitous occurrence." A repeat MRI 
cervical showed degenerative disc disease C5-6, C6-7 with 
narrowing of the spinal canal at that level due to osteophytes 
and ligamentous hypertrophy. The patient was placed on 
Sinemet which did not cause and change in his condition. At 
a time he felt possibly he had more spasticity than rigidity 
and then developed what was felt to be some functional 
findings on the left side. In October of 1988 he was noted 
to have extrapyramidal findings with infrequent blinking and 
increased tone on the left side more than the right, gait 
disturbance. Nerve conduction studies of the upper and lower 
extremities were normal. 
Neurological evaluation was performed by neurologist, Richard 
Barringer, University Medical Center, 3/9/89. The doctor felt 
that he had typical features of Parkinson's Disease, more 
marked on the left than the right. He could not explain the 
failure to respond to Sinemet, Another trial on Sinemet was 
carried out and, again, he had no response. The possibility 
of one of the Parkinson Plus Syndromes was considered but felt 
to be unlikely. Dr. Barringer felt this was Parkinson's 
Disease. On 7/30/89 Dr. Barringer mentioned that the cause 
of the disorder was questionable and he could not exclude the 
possibility that I t mi ght be related to a fal J that he 
suffered. 
Dr. Robert Feldman1s evaluation from Neurological Referral 
Center, Inc. in Boston was reviewed a letter to Dr. Barringer 
from Dr. Feldman dated 9/13/91. Dr. Feldman noted that at the 
time of the injury he had a seal p laceration but no 
penetration to the skull and was not unconscious. He 
mentioned tremor of the left index finger that Mr. Broadbent 
said began during the hospitalization. His letter mentions 
the medication program on which he started Mr. Broadbent which 
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included the current Eldepryl and Sineraet CR. 
IME from physiatrist, Richard Thomas, February of 1988. He 
gave him an 8% rating for his loss of cervical motion, 2% for 
loss of lumbosacral motion plus 5% for his coccygectomy for 
a total of 15% impairment. 
Physiatrist, John Bender, performed an IME on 9/18/90. He 
gave him 15% loss for lumbosacral loss of range of motion, 7% 
for loss of cervical range of motion, 5% for the coccygectomy 
and 12% for the impairments related to his Parkinson's like 
picture. This combined to a total of 34%. 
Orthopaedist, Douglas Scow, saw Mr. Broadbent for right 
shoulder pain in 1983. He felt he had a contusion strain of 
the right shoulder and trapezius muscle without consequence. 
PRIOR SPINE COMPLAINTS: 
Mr. Broadbent had been seen by chiropractor, Kelley Jarvis, 
since 1979, and also by chiropractor Gordon McClean in Provo. 
Dr. McClean had seen him since 1977 for an industrial accident 
and Dr. Jarvis from 1979 for problems in the spine, mostly mid 
thoracic and lumbar. He continues to see Dr. Jarvis about 
every 3 weeks for an adjustment. He feels that the 
adjustments last for about 2 to 3 weeks and decreases his pain 
by about 50% predominantly in his low back. 
CURRENT COMPLAINTS: 
He has a left hand tremor that involves minimally the left 
leg. On a bad day he is quite shaky and his left side gets 
quite rigid. He has increased fatigue. His left arm and left 
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leg are weak which he blames on the injury. Functionally he 
can tie his laces but it is somewhat difficult. He dresses 
slowly. He can button fairly well. He can shave without a 
problem. He can slowly get out of a chair but this problem 
is due to his back pain and not so much, he feels, his 
Parkinson's Disease. He can brush his teeth slowly. He has 
no problem with eating. His writing is fine. His voice 
quality is adequate. Walking up stairs is a problem only due 
to low back pain. Walking also is only limited by low back 
pain. Bowel, bladder and sexual function are normal. He 
feels he is progressively getting worse. He feels that the 
Sinemet helps only a stress like feeling in his body. NECK: 
Stiff and he has limited turning. He has intermittent pain 
with activity. Frequent extension and flexion will aggravate 
this problem. He has no problems in the dorsal spine. 
SHOULDERS: He has spasms under the shoulder blades. DORSAL: 
He has pain in that area in the low dorsal region when he 
leans forward. He has a constant aching anywhere from a 3 to 
a 7. LOW BACK PAIN: He has continuous stiffness in his low 
back anywhere between a 5 to a 9 intensity and aggravated by 
lifting. He sees Dr. Jarvis every 3 to 4 weeks who relieves 
his low back pain to some degree. He has some tingling down 
his legs and buttock pain. It is painful for him to sit on 
his tail bone which was injured at the time of the accident. 
He feels that his left upper extremity is 50% to 75% weaker 
and his left lower extremity is 40 to 60% weaker. He has no 
loss of feeling. He continues to have the Lhermitte's sign 
with tingling down his anterior torso and both lower 
extremities and toes when he flexes his neck. This has not 
changed since the injury. 
HOBBIES: 
Horse back riding, hunting and fishing. 
7 
SOCIAL HISTORY: 
Married, 2 dependent children at home. 
WORK HISTORY: 
He returned to work 9 months after the accident. He is 
currently working for Summit county as a building inspector 
and has been doing this for 2 and 1/2 years. This job has 
worked out quite well. 
LEGAL MATTERS: 
He is represented in this industrial accident matter by 
Attorney, Gene Miller. 
EDUCATION: 
Two quarters at the University of Utah. He has done 
construction work all of his life. 
MILITARY HISTORY: 
Two years in the Army. 
HABITS: 
Alcohol, tobacco denied. 
EXAMINATION: 
On general inspection he walked with a mildly f estinating gait 
without arm swing and slightly stooped. He had a mask like 
faces. e^", 190 pounds, right handed. 
GENERAL EXAMINATION: 
On general examination lungs: clear, heart: no murmurs. Blood 
pressure 150/106 right arm. 
CRANIAL NERVE EXAMINATION: 
Cranial nerves showed full extra-ocular movements and a mild 
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snout reflex. The cranial nerves were otherwise unremarkable. 
MOTOR: 
Tone was increased in both flexion and extension in all 
extremities, more so in the left upper and left lower 
extremity. He had mild cogwheeling of the left upper 
extremity. Reflexes were 3+ and equal throughout. His 
plantar reflexes were down going. Strength: he had give way 
strength in the left upper and left lower extremity anywhere 
between a 3 to 4/5 loss of function diffusely. 
SENSORY: 
Intact to pinprick throughout. 
CEREBELLAR: 
He had a negative head tremor. He had a mild Parkinsonian 
tremor involving the left upper and left lower extremity, 
especially the former. Finer to nose was done slowly but 
accurately as well as heel to shin. He had difficulty with 
repetitive movements, especially in the left hand. His 
handwriting was micrographic. 
SHOULDERS: 
There was elevation of the proximal clavicle at the right SC 
joint. He is also tender of the right acromion . Shoulder 
rnage of motion was normal. 
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EXTREMITIES: 
:IGHT 
12 
11 3/4 
19 1/2 
15 
LEFT 
11 
11 1/4 
20 
15 
CIRCUMFERENCES: 
UPPER ARMS 
FOREARMS 
THIGHS 
FORELEGS 
SPINE: 
Axial loading caused no pain 
CERVICAL SPINE: 
He was 1+ tender CI through C7 and over the right superior 
trapezius muscle. The muscles were supple. 
RANGE OF MOTION: 
Right rotation: 45°, left rotation: 45°, flexion: 35°, 
extension: 35°, left and right lateral flexion: 25°. 
DORSAL SPINE: 
Nontender. There was mild tenderness over the right rhomboid, 
35° of right and left rotation. 
LUMBOSACRAL SPINE AND COCCYX: 
He was tender over L5 and over the stump of the sacrum where 
there was a hollowed area and a well healed midline surgical 
incision. 
WEIGHT BEARING: 
Heel toe: normal right, left: poor. 
SQUAT: 
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Half squat with difficulty. 
LUMBOSACRAL RANGE OF MOTION: 
Right: 30°, left: 30°, flexion: 20/14, extension: 15/0. 
STRAIGHT LEG RAISING: 
Limited only by tight hamstrings at 45° bilaterally. 
HIPS: 
Full flexion and external and internal rotation. 
LEG LENGTHS: 
Equal. 
X-RAYS: 
CERVICAL: Showed mild spondylitic changes as described in the 
enclosed report, DORSAL: normal, LUMBOSACRAL: disc space, 
narrowing L5-S1 with spur formation. See enclosed report. 
RIGHT SHOULDER: Normal. Normal SC joint. 
ASSESSMENT: 
Mr. Broadbent suffered a significant industrial injury in 
October of 1982. The major trauma sustained was, of course, 
to his rectum and peroneal area requiring a temporary 
colostomy. His coccyx was shattered and was resected. He has 
been left with no difficulties with bowel, bladder or sexual 
function. He does have some residual pain over the resected 
bony stump. Additionally, he has ongoing pain in the spine, 
cervical through lumbar. Radiographically, we were able to 
identify mild spondylosis of the cervical region and moderate 
in the lumbosacral region which has developed over the past 
9 years following his injury. He did have problems in his 
spine prior to the injury and we had documentation of prior 
chiropractic visits. It appears that the injury has 
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aggravated that problem. 
The major area of concern here is that of the neurological 
consequence of his injury. Though he continues to have what 
is called a Lhermitte's sign which is the tingling down the 
torso into his legs, flexion of the neck an identifying source 
for that problem has never been discovered despite multiple 
cervical MRIs and myelograms. In itself, that does not cause 
a functional loss but is a sign of usual cervical cord injury 
which we have not been able to identify. The causal 
relationship to the accident appears evident, though. An 
impairment would not issue from that neurological sign. He 
has developed a form of Parkinson's Disease which has been 
refractory to the drugs commonly used to treat this condition. 
There is no reason to suspect that the trauma that he 
sustained in his industrial injury has any bearing on his 
Parkinson's features. Parkinson's Disease may issue from 
causes other than idiopathic including drug induced, chemical 
exposures such as carbon monoxide and presumably also in rare 
conditions after severe head injury. We do not have evidence 
here of any severe head injury. He had a bump on his head but 
without loss of consciousness. The Panel feels that it would 
be begging ones credibility to indict his Parkinson's being 
due to his industrial accident. Mr. Broadbent feels that 
there is a definite relationship because he feels that his 
symptomatology of the disease began temporally with the 
injury. That may be so, however, the Panel feels that the 
production of the symptomatology and the injury remains 
coincidental and not causal. 
In terms of reasonable medical probability the Panel finds 
that: 
The Parkinsonfs Disease was not the result of the industrial 
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accident of 10/6/82. 
2) Permanent impairment due ot industrial accident, pre-existing 
conditions and permanent aggravation of pre-existing 
conditions: 
PRE-EXISTING 1982 AGGRAVATION DUE TO TOTAL 
ACCIDENT 1982 ACCIDENT 
CERVICAL SPONDYLOSIS 
WITH DECREASED ROM* 10% 10% 
LUMBAR SPONDYLOSIS 
WITH DECREASED ROM* 
COCCYGECTOMY 
3% 7% 
5% 
10% 
5% 
COMBINED 3% 21% 23% 
*Some loss of ROM is due to underlying Parkinson. Therefore, 
not all loss assigned to the spondylosis. 
Gerald 
GRM/jbl 
Tx: 12/16/91 
Wallace E. Hess, M.D. 
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ATTACHMENT MBM 
Order, Administrative Law Judge 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No, 90000918 
* 
FRED BROADBENT, * 
Applicant, * 
vs• * ORDER 
* 
TOLBOE CONSTRUCTION and/or * 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY, EMPLOYERS * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
At the time and place set for the hearing in this matter, it 
was stipulated by the parties that the matters in dispute were 
medical only and were not factual, and as such would not require an 
evidentiary hearing. In addition, the parties, by and through 
counsel, agreed that the medical issues could be referred directly 
to the Medical Panel for its evaluation. 
The file and the applicant were referred to the Medical Panel 
for its evaluation. The Panel Report was received and copies were 
distributed to the parties. Fifteen(15) days having elapsed since 
the mailing of said Medical Panel Report, and no objections having 
been received thereto, the Panel Report is hereby admitted into 
evidence. 
The Medical Panel found that the applicant has sustained a 23% 
impairment of the whole person on a combined basis due to the 
industrial accident and the aggravation of a pre-existing 
condition. The Administrative Law Judge hereby adopts the findings 
of the Panel as his own. Pursuant to section 35-1-69 the applicant 
shall be entitled to a 20% award from the employer's carrier and 
shall receive a 3% impairment from the Employers Reinsurance Fund. 
In addition, the carrier, Industrial Indemnity shall be entitled to 
reimbursement from the ERF for 3/23 or 13% of the medical expenses 
and temporary total disability paid by them on behalf of the 
applicant as the result of the industrial accident of October 6, 
1982. 
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On the date of his industrial accident the applicant was 
earning wages sufficient to entitle him to the maximum award for 
permanent partial impairment of $189 per week. Therefore, the 
applicant is entitled to an award from the of $189 per week for 
62.4 weeks for a total of $11,793.60 in a lump sum plus interest of 
8% per annum from December 23, 1991. The ERF shall pay the 
applicant an award of 9.36 weeks at the rate of $189 per week for 
a total of $1,769.04 in a lump sum with 8% interest from December 
23, 1991. 
The applicant has had the benefit of legal counsel in this 
matter and counsel is entitled to a fee of $2,713, which shall be 
deducted from the applicant's award. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Industrial Indemnity pay Fred 
Broadbent compensation at the rate of $189 per week for 62.4 weeks 
for a total of $11,793.60 as compensation for a 20% impairment of 
the person due to the industrial accident of October 6, 1982. 
These benefits shall be paid in a lump sum with 8% interest from 
December 23, 1991. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Industrial Indemnity pay Eugene C. 
Miller, Jr., Attorney for applicant, the sum of $2,713 for services 
rendered in this matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid 
award to the applicant and remitted directly to his office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Industrial Indemnity shall be 
entitled to reimbursement from the ERF for 13% of the ttd and 
medical expenses paid by them on behalf of the applicant as the 
result of the industrial accident. Said reimbursement to be had 
uupon the submission of a verified petition setting forth the 
amounts so expended. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the ERF pay Fred Broadbent 
compensation at the rate of $189 per week for 9.36 weeks for a 
total of $1,769.04 for a 3% permanent partial impairment due to 
pre-existing conditions. These benefits shall be paid in a lump 
sum with 8% interest from December 23, 1991. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and , unless so filed, this Order shall be final and 
not subject to review or appeal. 
Certified this 
7th day of March, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March °f, 1992, a copy of the attached 
Order in the case of Fred Broadbent was mailed to the following 
persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Fred Broadbent 
2774 E. 1200 So. 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Eugene C. Miller, Jr. 
Attorney 
311 So. State, #240 
SLC, Utah 84111 
Stuart Poelman, Esq. 
P.O. 45000 
SLC, Utah 84145 
Erie Boorman, Esq. 
ERF 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Tim Allen / ' 6 
ATTACHMENT "C" 
Denial of Respondent's Motion for Review and Denial 
of Applicant's Motions for Review in Part 
JUN 0 1 1992 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600 
Fred Broadbent, 
Applicant, 
vs, 
* 
* 
* 
Tolboe Construction and/or * 
Industrial Indemnity, * 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, ' 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR REVIEW AND 
DENIAL OF APPLICANT'S 
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW 
IN PART 
Case No. 90000918 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motions for 
Review of applicant Fred Broadbent and respondents Tolboe 
Construction and Industrial Indemnity in the above captioned 
matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and 
Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant and the respondents Tolboe Construction and/or 
Industrial Indemnity submitted Motions for Review of the 
administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision in the above captioned 
case. The applicant submitted two Motions for Review of the ALJ's 
decision of March 9, 1992, one on March 18, 1992, and the second 
one on April 6, 1992. Both were timely filed. 
The above named respondents submitted their response to 
applicant7s first motion on April 8, 1992, and also, on that date 
timely submitted their Motion for Review. On April 20, 1992, the 
applicant responded to respondent's April 8, 1992 reply to 
applicant's Motion for Review, and on April 24, 1992 responded to 
respondent's Motion for Review. Respondents provided a further 
reply on May 12, 1992 to applicant's Motion for Review of April 6, 
1992. 
All parties need to be aware that responses to motions for 
review must be filed with the Commission within 15 days of the 
mailing date of the motion for review, or such responses may be 
considered untimely. U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12 (1953 as amended 
1988) . Since there were untimely responses from all parties, and 
because we have received no objections to the untimely filings, we 
will consider the responses. 
Relevant facts are as follows. The applicant sustained an 
industrial accident on October 6, 1982. Tolboe Construction and 
Industrial Indemnity paid medical expenses and temporary total 
disability benefits (TTD). The respondents claim that the 
applicant refused tender of payment for permanent partial 
disability (PPD) due to a disagreement as to the correct PPD 
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rating. The tender was made on June 4, 1987. The applicant filed 
an application for hearing in October 1990. 
In answer to the hearing application, respondents denied 
liability for PPD compensation asserting that the Industrial 
Commission of Utah (IC) is precluded from making a PPD award at any 
time subsequent to eight years after the date of the accident, and 
basing this assertion on U.C.A. Section 35-1-66. By order dated 
March 9, 1992, the ALJ awarded the applicant PPD benefits, but did 
not address the eight year limitation provision contained in the 
statute. 
Because of a series of disputes between the parties, and among 
the physicians, as to the proper PPD rating, the ALJ referred this 
case to a medical panel. On December 10, 1991, the panel awarded 
the appliccint a 23 percent impairment rating. The ALJ adopted the 
medical panel impairment rating of 2 3 percent, and ordered that the 
applicant7s compensation be paid in a lump sum plus interest of 
eight percent from December 23, 1991. 
The only issue raised in applicant's Motion for Review dated 
March 18, 1992 was whether the date of December 23, 1991 was the 
proper date for the interest to begin accrual. The applicant 
contends that interest should begin on June 9, 1983 which is the 
day after the date upon which the applicant's TTD was terminated. 
Alternatively, the applicant argues that if the Commission decides 
that the interest should not begin on that date, the interest 
clearly should begin on April 23, 1984 which is the date that the 
applicant met the standard for a permanent partial impairment 
rating of 20 percent. 
The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in ordering 
that interest on the PPD award commenced on December 23, 1991 since 
that was the date that the liability of the respondents was first 
medically determined. We agree with the respondents on this issue. 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the rationale behind the 
award of interest on workers compensation benefits: 
Thus, it is clear that compensation for worker 
disability is legislation for the public wel-
fare. It is also clear that the statute pro-
viding for interest on unpaid benefits was a 
legislative attempt to remedy a serious social 
problem: the depreciation of the value of bene-
fits as a result of non-receipt of the weekly 
benefit for months, or perhaps years, until a 
final determination of eligibility and an award 
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was made. 
Marshall v. Ind. Comm'n, 704 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1985). 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-78 provides in pertinent part: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall in-
clude interest at the rate of 8% per annum from 
the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable. 
1953 as amended 1981. 
Further, our rules state that: 
For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits 
shall become "due and payable" (as used in Section 
35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows: 
* * * 
2. Permanent partial compensation shall be 
due and payable on the next day follow-
ing the termination of a temporary total 
disability. However, where the condition 
is not fixed for rating purposes, the in-
terest shall commence from the date the 
permanent partial impairment can be medi-
cally determined. 
Emphasis added; Rule 490-1-12 (Utah Admin. Code 1991). 
There has been no allegation by the applicant of bad faith or 
dilatory tactics on the part of the respondents in paying the 
interest. Our decision on the award of interest may be different 
in cases where the employer cannot show that it proceeded with some 
dispatch to provide payments to injured employees who were entitled 
to such payments. 
Under the circumstances, interest accrues from the date of 
December 23, 1991 as correctly determined by the ALJ. 
The applicant in his Motion for Review dated April 6, 1992 
also argues that he has never received reimbursement for his 
travel. The ALJ Order is silent as to this issue, and the 
respondents7 reply to applicants motion argues that the Order did 
not contain any consideration of the mileage claim because the 
applicant did not submit itemized information reflecting the 
particular amounts of mileage expense claimed for the various 
periods involved to the ALJ as the ALJ had ordered. The applicant 
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has not responded to this allegation of respondents so we will 
treat this statement by the respondents as true for purpose of our 
decision. 
The current pertinent rule which was effective on March 16, 
192 provides that: 
An employee who, based upon his/her physi-
cian's advice, requires hospital, medical, 
surgical, or consultant services for in-
juries arising out of and in the course of 
€>mployment and who is authorized by the 
self-insurer, the carrier, or the Industrial 
Commission to obtain such services from a 
physician and or hospital shall be entitled 
to [certain reimbursements]. 
R568-2-19A (Utah Admin. Code 1992). 
The rule further provides that n[r]equests for travel 
reimbursement must be submitted to the carrier for payment within 
one year of the authorized care. R568-2-19B4 (Utah Admin. Code 
1992) . Therefore, such mileage reimbursement requests are 
authorized under the current rule as an expense which can be passed 
on to the carrier or employer unless the employee does not submit 
such request for reimbursement within one year of the authorized 
care. 
The applicant does not fall under the current rule since he 
was injured in 1982, and since he clearly filed his application 
before the effective date of the new rule. Therefore, the 
requirement that the applicant submit his requests for travel 
reimbursement to the carrier within one year of the authorized care 
will apply in his case only to those medical treatments, and other 
circumstances within the mileage reimbursement rule which were 
incurred subsequent to March 15, 1992. 
Carriers should not impose rigid and onerous requirements on 
injured employees to prove mileage expenses. Such requirements are 
contrary to the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. However, 
the carrier may reasonably require the injured employee to show 
that he/she attended a medical appointment or other required 
treatment along with a statement from the injured employee showing 
the mileage from the home/work of the employee to the place of 
treatment and return. 
Rather than the carrier simply stating that the burden has not 
been met, it is incumbent upon the carrier to tell the employee 
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precisely what will be reasonably needed to substantiate the 
reimbursement. Preferably this should be discussed, among such 
items as how the claim will be processed, early in the process when 
the carrier assigns an adjuster to the case. Such a discussion 
will avoid much of the contention presented by arguments over 
mileage as presented in this case. 
We do not have sufficient information on which to approve or 
disapprove applicant's claim for mileage in this case. The 
applicant has provided us with a list of the mileage amounts 
claimed for the various years. Had the applicant provided this 
list more punctually, it could have been considered by the ALJ. 
However, in the interest of conserving time, we will dispose of 
this issue. 
The carrier must do more than say that the amounts are old and 
unsubstantiated. The applicant has listed the day, month, and year 
for most of his trips, the medical practitioner or facility 
visited, and the number of miles. The carrier presumably has the 
medical records and bills which it paid to verify these trips. It 
would seem that sufficient information has been provided on which 
the carrier can determine the claim. Since the applicant was late 
turning in his claim, the carrier will have ten days from the 
issuance of our order in which to provide us more information about 
its specific objections, and about what it needs in the way of 
substantiation which are not within its records of the case, or we 
will approve the amounts claimed. 
The remaining issue to be discussed, and which is the only 
issue raised by the respondents in their Motion for Review is 
whether U.C.A. Section 35-1-66 of the Utah Workers' Compensation 
Act prohibits the Commission from making an award to the applicant 
of permanent partial disability after eight years from the date of 
applicant's injury. 
The statute in question reads: 
The Commission may make a permanent partial 
disability award at any time prior to eight 
years after the date of injury to an em-
ployee whose physical condition resulting 
from such injury is not finally healed and 
fixed eight years after the date of the in-
jury and who files an application for such 
purpose prior to the expiration of such 
eight-year period. 
Emphasis added. (1953 as amended 1981). 
The ALJ Issued his decision more than nine years after the 
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date of injury. This precludes the Commission from ordering the 
respondents to pay an award of permanent partial disability to the 
applicant argue the respondents. To buttress this argument, the 
respondents further contend that the delay in seeking the 
Commission/s award was caused by the applicant. 
The use of the word "may" clearly shows that the Commission is 
not required to make such award within the eight year period, 
although it may do so. This particular statute is applicable to 
those situations where the applicants condition has not 
stabilized, but the applicant desires that his medical condition be 
rated even though under normal circumstances no rating would be 
provided until stabilization. Under these circumstances, such 
applicant can force a rating if requested prior to the expiration 
of the eight year period. 
In this case, the applicant clearly filed his application 
before the eight year period. 
For these reasons, the Commission affirms the ALJ's decision. 
There is substantial evidence in light of the entire record to 
uphold the* findings of the ALJ, and his conclusions of law are 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated March 9, 1992 is affirmed. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the respondents shall have ten 
days from the date of issuance of this Order to provide to the 
Commission any specific objections to the mileage reimbursement 
request shown at Exhibit A, Applicant's Motion for Review filed on 
April 6, 1992. The applicant shall have ten days from the date of 
service upon him to respond to respondent's objections, if any. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
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transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes, 
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